2am: Weather fine but misty. Orders were received that at 9.25am attack was to be launched. This was to be preceded by a bombardment when light and mist permitted. Barrage to lift at 9.45am.

At 9.25am (zero time) battalion advanced over the open space in one wave to occupy line on or near Bulls Road. The line was excellently maintained & the dressing well kept. The preliminary bombardment, which began directly, mist and light permitted - about 6.45am – was very weak & made no appreciable increase in the intensity was noticeable at zero.

The heavy artillery barraged the village of Guedecourt but this village appeared to be weakly held, as, beyond occasional sniping, little fire came from it. Heavy machine gun fire however came from both flanks of the village causing only a few casualties during the advance Most of the fire was high and the enemy artillery – mostly 77mm – was very badly ranged. During the advance of the 6^th Som L I & the 10^th D.L.I the machine gun fire (from the flanks of the village) was more accurate & these two battalions suffered many casualties in consequence.

10.20am: A message was sent from this Battalion to 6^th Som LI as follows: “Enemy appear to have machine gun barrage on our right flank. It seems useless to pour more men into it. Our artillery ought to be informed. Can you get one to them”. No reply was received to this message, consequently at 10.30am the advance was again continued but owing to their heavy casualties occurring in the advanced battalions (6^th Som L I & 10 D.L.I) it was decided to advance this battalion in more than one wave. The formation adopted was waves of half Coys in extended order with a distance of 100 yards between waves no ? in each wave suffered heavily through the terrific machine gun fire but they reached the advanced position & intermixed with the 6^th Som L I & 10^th D L I. Two Vickers machine guns with their teams were sent forward & they also suffered heavily.

11am: At about this time it was suspected that the Division (Guards) on our right had not advanced, consequently a patrol of 2 men was dispatched to mount the crest to ascertain if such was the case. This patrol did not return, both men becoming casualties. At 12 noon another patrol of 2 men was dispatched for the same purpose, one man returned & reported no movement on the right & machine gun fire still very heavy.

11.15am: A message was sent to Brigade that signals had been made to our aeroplanes that machine gun barrage was holding up the advance, that tanks had broken down & that several masses of enemy had left Guedecourt & to warn artillery.

1.30pm: Brigade replied “hold on where you are until situation has been cleared up on Divisional right.

1.40pm: What appeared to be a counter attack in four waves developed W of Guedecourt – strength about 2 Coys. This was barraged by our artillery & broken up, the enemy appeared to vanish into trenches.

During the afternoon enemy aircraft became very active & flying unusually low. At the same time enemy artillery fire became heavy on all our lines – 5.9” and 4.2” shells being used freely. Casualties from this source were but slight.

4.00pm: Brigade message stated that our artillery had been ordered to bombard Gird Support & that Division on right (Guards) had been ordered to advance at 4pm & take Les Boeufs at all cost. 6^th Som L I were ordered to advance in co-operation if the chances were considered reasonable, the 6^th K.O.Y.L.I placing two Coys at their disposal. The 10^th D.L.I were ordered to make every effort to get in touch with left of 6^th Som L I & the 6^th D.C.L.I were to be applied to for assistance if necessary.

4.25pm: A message was received from 6 Som L.I. which stated that he had decided not to advance at 4pm as suggested but would try and occupy Gird Trench at dusk.

6.10pm: Orders were received to resume the attack at 6.55pm, the 43^rd Brigade being reinforced by two Battalions of 42^nd Brigade, the object being the capture of Gird Support & if this proved successful the attack would be continued on Guedecourt. It proved very difficult to get orders out to OC’s Coys in the short space of time allowed, also to organise, as casualties had been heavy in both officers and other ranks & the situation had been confused owing to Battalions becoming mixed. However at 6.55pm the whole line had advanced with the utmost gallantry but an intense machine gun fire opened from both flanks causing excessive casualties. Every Coy commander had either been killed or wounded & only two very junior officers remained in the firing line. After advancing 200 yards the attack melted away & the remaining men crawled back.

7.40pm: After consolidation with the 6^th Som L.I & 10^th D.L.I a defensive line consisting of all units in the Brigade was established in Bulls Road. This was reinforced by 4 Vickers Guns.

Our casualties were 15 officers (out of 20) & 294 other ranks out of about 550 all ranks who participated in the operations.

8.30pm: Orders were received from Brigade cancelling attack on Guedecourt, but attack on Gird Support was to be continued with. This order was issued at 6.15pm but did not reach Battalion HQ before 8.30pm.

After line had been consolidated all units of the Brigade stood to until relieved.

5am [17^th] Battalion relieved by 10^th Yorkshire Regiment (21^st Division). On completion of relief it moved back in small columns to bivouac in Pommiers Redoubt.