Part 1 - 2nd/3rd May

When active operations began in the Battle of Arras the battalion consisted of 38 officers and 957 men. They now arrived in the back area with 29 officers and 696 men. The Brigadier General sent his congratulations for the “endurance of all ranks under the very trying circumstances”. The XVII Corps commander, Lieutenant General Charles Ferguson, voiced similar sentiments to the Divisional Commander - the operations were a “great success since the first day when we broke through the 4^th German system of trenches and…held the line for nearly a fortnight without relief under the worst possible conditions of weather” (1665). The ‘grit’ and endurance’ were “worthy of the best traditions of the Old Army of which they are still representative”.

At Ambrines five subalterns and 58 other ranks joined from the base. On April 23 there was a further move to Beaufort for training, sport and rest. During this period there was some evaluation of the earlier operation. Five days later the battalion set off for Y Huts, west of Etrun, north west of Arras, and, a day later, into Arras where Battalion HQ was established at 56, Rue des Augustines. They now prepared to return to the trenches in the area of Corona and Ceylon Trenches which curled south and east of the hamlet which contained Rouex Station, the Chateau and the notorious Chemical Works and between there and the main village

On the morning of May 2 the battalion’s front line trenches were evacuated to enable heavy guns to bombard the Chemical Works, Cemetery and Chateau. They were re-occupied at dusk when new operational orders for May 3 were issued as part of a wider, major Third Army thrust with three army corps along a six mile front. 10^th Brigade and the 1/Somerset Light Infantry of 11^th Brigade were to attack the German position between Fresnes-les-Montabon and Plouvain. They would be on the right of IV Division. The Warwicks were to be on the Brigade left with the first wave tasked with taking the Black Line (Roeux) and the second wave the Blue Line (between Rouex and Plouvain), the second objective. Each wave was to consist of two lines twenty yards apart followed by moppers-up. The second wave was to assemble in Coop Trench and their moppers up had to concentrate on the Chateau, houses along the Roeux-Gavrelle road and the Chalk Pit. ‘A’ company did not have a direct role and were to remain on the Bank near Battalion HQ and act as carriers. The attackers had to be in position by 11.30 p.m on May 2 with zero hour at 3.45 a.m on May 3. A creeping barrage would lift at fifty yards a minute. Before each lift smoke would be fired and gas from Livens Projectors would be used if the wind was favourable. The Black Line would be consolidated by digging lunette trenches. The second wave would be helped by two sections of the 10^th Machine Gun Company. The plan required a contact aeroplane to pass over at 6.15 a.m. The most advanced troops only would light red ground flares. The plan avoided a direct attack on Roeux from the west and sought to turn the village from the north.

Lieutenant Colonel Forster wrote a detailed narrative/diary of the battalion’s operations from May 3 to the night of May 4/5 – dated May 5. At 12.30 a.m. on May 3 they had formed up in their Assembly positions. An Advanced Signal Station (telephone and runner) had been established next to an observation post with the Inteligence Officer at the junction of the front line with the railway embankment. At 4.45 a.m. a message was received from Captain W.G Cox, commanding ‘B’ company, that the second wave was being held up by machine gun fire from a shell hole south of the Chateau. Soon afterwards eight German prisoners were brought in, mainly from the 252 Regiment. Then runners from the Advanced Signal Station brought a message that the first wave had got ‘well away’ but were met with machine gun fire. ‘D’ company appeared to have got into the first German line and the houses although a wounded man had reported many casualties. A message timed at 6.50 a.m. reported that the Household Battalion was held up at a line in houses near the Cemetery. The left Warwicks’ company (‘D’) was ‘hung up in front of houses in shell holes north of the Chateau’. The Germans were still holding on to the northern extremity of the Chateau and buildings north of it. ‘D’ company had met heavy machine gun fire going over the parapet and were now starting to fall back to the original line. The 10^th Machine Gun Company had also fallen back.

At 10.45 a.m. an officers’ patrol was sent through the Chateau grounds. Second Lieutenant Smith reported back at 12.30 p.m…“that he had with great difficulty, owing to sniping + MG, reached close up to the Chateau on south side of wall but could get no further east and could see no troops of ours near the Chateau holding out on the road south and east of Chateau”.

At about noon a message came from Brigade that ‘it was definitely known that some 150 men of the Brigade of all battalions were consolidating on the Black Line’. A German counter-attack on the Black Line at about 4 p.m was repulsed by artillery fire. At 7 p.m. Second Lieutenant McLeod came in wounded and reported that he had come from the Black Line to find out the situation of other troops. “He was fired on most of the way and was wounded when near the Chateau. He crawled in. His statement was that there were about 150 men of Lancs Fusiliers, R War R (70) and HB (Household Battalion) who were digging in on 1^st objective, the Black Line, but there were no troops on their right”.

The Colonel’s conclusion was that “The attack in the morning failed greatly due to the darkness and therefore difficulty the Mopping Up Coy had in finding the entrances in the Chateau and surrounding houses. I also think the Moppers were not strong enough in numbers. From what information I could get I think the 1^st wave got through to the Black Line and commenced consolidation there and eventually were taken being isolated”.

Others noted the inadequate preliminary barrage, the distance to be covered by reduced numbers because of earlier losses and the barrage outdistancing the attacking troops.