Military History

Arthur is listed as being killed in action on 3rd December 1917 during the Battle of Cambrai. The 2/5th Battalion war diary entries and the referenced report on operations for the period 2nd to 4th December are transcribed below

Heudecourt - 2/12/17: Battalion moved by Fins-Metz-e Coutre to Gouzeaucourt Wood, halting there till 4.45pm & then moving ti relieve the 2/8 Worcesters in the line NE of Le Vacquerie.

La Vacquerie – 3/12/17: See report attached

On the night of 2^nd/3^rd December 1917 I relieved the 2/8^th Worcesters NE of La Vacquerie, my dispositions being:

One Coy (B) in trench between R.16.b.65.20 to about R.16.b.4.7 and in touch with the unit in their left.

Two Coys (A & C) in shell holes in front of trench between R.16.c.35.35 and R.16.c.50.90 ready to attack the trenches in R.16.d lost by the 2/8^th Gloucesters.

One Coy (D) in support between R.16.c.35 and R.16.c.50.99. Battalion HQ at R.15.d.50.65 with one company of 2/8^th Worcesters close by.

Touch was established by my right flank about R.16.c.6.3 between my support Coy and the support Coy of the 2/4^th Gloucesters and my part of this line re-organised with new Lewis Gun positions. Touch was also gained with the advanced Coy of the 2/4^th Gloucesters in Vacant Alley.

The attack commenced at 7.30am on December 3^rd covering fire being arranged for by Lewis Guns and R.G.s [Rifle Grenades] on the left forward flank and by Lewis Guns of the 2/4^th Gloucesters in Vacant Alley. Very heavy opposition was encountered and the remnants of the two companies disappeared, one or two men only returning to the support Coy.

At about 8.20am the enemy placed an intense and accurate barrage on my support Coy and another across the southern edge of La Vacquerie, then lifting on to a line drawn almost E & W through Battalion HQ.

About 8.30am my left Coy was attacked by bombing parties on their right flank, but they held their ground until ordered to withdraw to the vicinity of R.10.c, I believe by the O.C. 2/7^th Warwicks. They did so about 6am on December 4^th.

About 8.45am on December 3^rd my support Coy was also attacked on its right flank and they therefore took up their position facing the attack along the road running almost E & W through R.16.c.5.9. They succeeded in keeping the enemy off, but few survivors remain and they retired when ordered to do so with my left Coy.

About 9am the 2nd in Command of the 2/4^th Gloucesters reported to me that the whole of his line had gone and his Battalion HQ moved. The enemy attack had come almost at a right angle to my front and my flank was therefore left in the air.

Almost immediately afterwards the barrage lifted further North and I stood to with all details and manned the posts previously reconnoitred for defence, when the enemy were seen working up through the village. A strong attack developed but was repulsed, the enemy signalling by firing white Very lights. The fire fight continued until just before noon when the supply of ammunition became almost exhausted. The enemy then made bombing attacks up the communication trenches supported by Machine Gun fire and Granatenwerfter on our front posts and heavy shell fire on our rear line.

These were held off for a time but out bomb supply also became exhausted and casualties had become heavy. There was no hope of continuing this fight with bombs and I therefore decided to abandon the front posts (which included Battalion HQ) but to continue to hold the line about 50 yards in rear, where we could not easily be bombed.

I therefore place the line along Welsh Road from R.15.c.6.6 to R.15.d.25.70 with a left flank defence along Corner Support with orders to all not to retire as I considered it could be held with the bayonet. Some ammunition was salved and two later attacks repulsed.

When I posted my now left flank I gained touch with a part of a company of the 2/6^th Warwicks who informed me that they been ordered to occupy the Northern part of Corner Support. I also collected a few other odd troops and placed them in support in the trenches running roughly E & W through R.15.c.2.9. and R.15.a.9.3.

As the situation then seemed satisfactory and the enemy well held I searched for support to organise a counter-attack but only found two Coys manning Farm Trench and the trenches running NE from R.15.a.85.70 to form a defensive flank under orders of 182^nd Infantry Brigade and I presumed I was not at liberty to use them.

I then got into touch with the 2/5^th Gloucesters and reported personally to the G.O.C. 183^rd Infantry Brigade afterwards establishing my HQ with the 2/5^th Gloucesters. During the night the details holding the vicinity of Corner Support were relieved by the 2/4^th Berks, and I withdrew my men to Farm Ravine establishing my HQ there with the 2/7^th Worcesters.

A large amount of gas shells were used by the enemy.

When it appeared possible that the Battalion HQ would be rushed all papers, maps and B.A.B. codes there were burnt, although some may have fallen into the hands of the enemy through my missing officers of the two attacking Coys.

I wish to mention that I saw no backward movement of my own men and did not know that the 2/4^th Gloucesters line had gone until just before I was myself strongly attacked at Battalion HQ and then a counter-attack to restore the line with my small forces was impossible.

The times given above may not be exact as my notes were burnt.

I wish to bring notice to the gallant conduct of Captain’s Pritchett (killed) and Holcroft of the 2/8^th Worcesters. Other officers and men of their battalion, whose names I do not know, also did extremely well.

P.L.Coates, Lt. Col Commanding 2/5^th R. Warwick Regt. 08/12/17.