Front Line Trenches - Maison Rouge - 26th: The enemy appeared to be apprehensive, firing heavily at dawn and early morning on all positions which might be used as forming up areas. On the night of the 26th 2/Lieut H.A. Finch and 8 O.R went out on patrol to get in touch with the enemy. The patrol did not return. 2/Lieut Finch was found killed 1000 yards in front our line when the Battalion advanced on the 27th.

For account of operations on the 27th and 28th see attached narrative.

2^nd Bn Grenadier Guards - Narrative of Operations 27^th/28^th August 1918 (Partial Transcription)

Objective: The role of the Battalion was to push forward at zero with the 2^nd Bn Coldstream Guards in its left and 62^nd Division on its right and penetrate and occupy the enemy defences in and south of Ecoust and Lougatte.

The night [26^th/27^th] was fine and there was little shelling, Unfortunately while No 1 Company were moving across the open to their forming up position a shell fell in the centre of No 1 Platoon fatally wounding Lieut N.H. Ponsonby who was commanding the Company and causing casualties to the whole platoon except 4.O.R. Lieut Jesper took over command of the remaining three platoons of the company.

Zero was at 7.0am on August 27^th when a field-gun barrage was put down on a line 500 yards in front of the leading company creeping forward at the rate of 100 yards in two minutes. At zero the Battalion advanced from its forming up position [Mally Copse & Mory Switch] and within a few minutes of advancing came under intense M.G. fire from the German M.G. nests in Banks Trench and Banks Reserve, and from this moment any movement resulted in casualties.

The frontage allotted to the Battalion was 1500 yards which made flank connection of the utmost difficultly.

Captain J.C. Cornforth, MC led his Company forward from the sunken road and found that owing to the intensity of the M.G. fire and the proximity of the enemy a prolonged advance on his left was impossible – all the more because the Battalion on his left had been already held up. At this point Lieut. R.M. Oliver was killed. Capt. Cornforth therefore led forward his right half Company hoping thereby to relieve the pressure on his left and compel the enemy to retire by his outflanking move. During this advance the machine gun fire grew more and more intense and the further forward he advanced the more casualties were suffered from withering and accurate enfilade fire from his left. The advance of this half of No 3 Company was held up temporarily by a very strongly entrenched machine gun nest in Banks trench who swept the whole forward slope of the ground leading up to it. Enfilade fire from the left flank was still equally severe and in the capture of this position very heavy casualties were suffered, 2/Lieut F.J. Langley being killed.

At this point No. 1 Company, who throughout their advance had suffered heavily, was sent up to reinforce No. 3 Company assist in capturing  the position. Lieuts Jespher and Giles had already been wounded and, having no officers, the remainder of this Company from this time came under the command of Capt. Cornforth. With these reinforcements Banks Trench was rushed and occupied North of L’Honre Nort but the M.G. fire from the left flank had not abated and now fire was opened on them from Banks Reserve.

Not having enough troops to extend to the flanks and drive the enemy from the northern position of Banks Trench, it was decided to remain in the position already gained. Consolidation and reorganisation were impossible during daylight owing to the intensity of the fire; so also was communication to the flanks and the rear.

No 2 Company at Zero moved out in diamond formation and immediately came under the most intense M.G. fire from the N.E. and E. Captain Martin-Smith at once ordered his company to extend. During this extension he himself and 2/Lieut de Lisle were wounded, Lieut Gwyer shortly afterwards being killed. The 50 O.R which remained in the Company came under the command of L/S E. Frost. Further advance was impossible and this company consolidate as far as enemy fire would permit along the sunken road in B.10.b.

No 4 Company advanced on the right boundary of the Battalion along Mory Switch and the southern end of Banks Trench, eventually establishing a position in Vraijcourt Trench in C.13.d., keeping up to the barrage the whole time but suffering heavy casualties from both flanks and the front. This Company captured a German Battalion Commander and 180 OR during the advance.

Lieut Morgan having penetrated the enemy’s position to a depth of 2000 yards beyond any other British troops being enfiladed from all sides decided to withdraw his company after dark to get into touch with troops on his flanks.

On the night of August 27^th the Battalion consolidated a line running parallel to and 200 yards west of Banks Trench with one company of the Irish Guards brought up on the left to fill the gap between the Battalion and the 2^nd Battalion Coldstream Guards.

During the evening the M.G. fire grew less intense and there were signs of the enemy having been forced to retire. This was found to be the case for on August 28^th the Battalion was able to push strong patrols and advanced the line to Banks reserve gaining ground to the extent of some 1700 yards. This line was handed over to 1^st Battalion Gordon Highlanders ion the night of August 28^th.

On relief the Battalion moved back to the trenches east of Hamlincourt. Lieut Colonel G.E.C Rasch D.S.O, Captain Cornforth, Lieut Briscoe and Lieut Morgan were the only officers who came out with the Battalion and Companies came out at the following strength ([in WW1 the standard Company size was 227 officers and men]:-

No. 1 Company               32 O.R
No. 2 Company               51 O.R
No. 3 Company               76 O.R.
No. 4 Company               48 O.R