On the evening of the 25^th instant the Battalion moved off at 7pm to take up its position in the trenches at Courcelette. At 9.15pm Battalion HQ’s was established in dug-out at about R.30.a.4.4.

The parties of the 27^th and 28^th Battalions, holding trenches were relieved in good time, but, owing to the cramped space, the assembly took the greater part of the night. Our difficulties in this report were greatly increase[d] by the fact that the front and support trenches as far East as Miraumont Road W. were occupied by the 13^th Battalion, that is to say that they were occupying about 200 yards of trench space in the area allotted to the 6^th Brigade. I sent my Adjutant to see the Adjutant of this Battalion on the matter, but he was informed that the 13^th Battalion had received orders to hold that line and they could not leave it. This was a most unfortunate matter, as, even if these trenches had not been vacant the assembly space would still have been very limited.

All positions were taken up  before daybreak on the 26^th. The dispositions for attack were as shown in the following diagram:- [Not shown here]

At one minute to the Zero hour machine guns in our rear opened a strong barrage on enemy’s lines. At zero artillery barrage commenced. I noticed at the time that it appeared that is appeared to be in the rear of our objective, and, from the statements of those engaged in the attack, such seems to have been the case.

I was able to see the waves moving across No Mans Land all, apparently, going well, but very quickly after Zero the enemy opened such a heavy barrage on Courcelette that nothing more could be seen through the smoke and dust.

From the reports of those engaged in the attack it appears that the enemy was quite unshaken and immediately opened with very heavy rifle and machine gun fire, which inflicted such heavy casualties upon our men that they found it impossible to reach their objective.

I quote here from the report of Lieut. H. Kennedy, the only officer who survived the attack on the right.: “I joined Capt Johnson in his Company HQ about 2pm 26-9-1916. We discussed the situation and decided that I should take charge of the left half of B Company and go over the parapet in command of the first waves which consisted of No 5 & No 7 Platoons. Capt Johnson was to take over the 2^nd wave, viz, No 6 & No 8 Platoons.

I joined my half Company about 4.45pm 26-9-16 and took command. Sgt P Murray was Platoon Sergeant of No 7 and Sgt McMullen of No 8. We laid low and kept very quiet until zero time and then went over the parapet. We were met by a deadly fire of machine guns and I lost nearly all my men in the first 75 yards. The barrage never rested on the German trench at all and the German barrage commenced at almost the same time our ours. When I saw all of my men go down I dropped into a shell hole and waiting for the barrage to lift. I went forward again to within 25 yards of the trenches but me several German snipers on the parapet and had to retire to the shell-hole then later to the trench in the fork of Sunken and Miraumont Roads. I held that trench until the 2^nd advance”.

On our extreme right one of Lewis Gun Crews succeeded in reaching the objective and putting the gun in position on the left of the 29^th Battalion. This position was retained throughout.

The left of our attack encountered similar conditions to those described by Lieut Kennedy and all officers and senior NCO’s were killed or wounded. In addition to the fire from the German parapet the enfilade machine gun fire, particularly from the enemy’s left appears to have been very heavy.

At 5.10pm the OC Reserve Company reported enemy were attacking and he had very few men to resist attack. As I did not know how units on each side were getting on I thought the situation might be very serious and I therefore collected all details from Battalion HQ’s and took them down to the front line. When I got there I found that a number of men had returned to our front line from No Mans Land and that is was now adequately held. The Germans had made an attempt to advance but this had been promptly stopped. After remaining for about an hour in the Front Line I returned to Battalion HQ.

At 7.00pm I received orders to organise a second attack, making use of two Companies of the 27^th Battalion who were being sent up to reinforce me. I fixed Zero Hour at 11pm and proceeded to make necessary dispositions. I decided to form two companies and arrange the place of attack as shown in the following diagram [not shown here].

The attack took place at Zero, after an intense bombardment for 10 minutes. It was understood that heavy artillery would co-operate but it does not appear to have done so.

The enemy was again found to be quite unshaken on the left and the trenches could not be entered. Capt L’Amy in charge of this section of the attack was buried by a shell and Lieut Gordon, the other officer of the 31^st Battalion was killed.

The right attack was more successful. I quote again from Lieut Kennedy’s report:- “At 11pm, 26-9-1916 we went forward again, reinforced by about 2o men under Capt McCaw of the 27^th Battalion. We took the trench and connected up with the 29^th Battalion on the right, but could not connect with Capt L’Amy on the left beyond the Miraumont Road. We had now reached our objective and established ourselves and held onto the trench. Lewis Machine Gun Crew reached our objective in the first attack. They went into a shell hole beyond the trench, dug themselves in and held on until we took the trench. They then came in to me and placed the gun in a position to command the Miraumont Road.

Sergeant Profit went over with me in the second wave but was killed by a shell about 1pm on 27-9-16. That night [29-9-16] I posted a patrol of 5 men and a corporal about 75yards up Miraumont Road to warn us in case of a counter-attack, The 27^th Battalion gave me a Lewis Gun and crew, which I placed about 50 yards from the Miraumont Road. We were constantly on the look out for a counter-attack which never developed. As far as I could judge there were no trenches immediately on our front to the right of Miraumont Road closer than a thousand yards, only bits of unfinished trenches and the snipers and machine gun crews isolated in shell holes”.

At 3.30am [27-9-16], thinking it vital we should retain the ground gained I ordered A Coy 27^th Battalion (about 49 strong) to reinforce the right.

At this time Lieut Kennedy was, as far as I knew, the only unwounded officer of the 31^st Battalion, but a little later Capt L’Amy, who had been buried close  to the German lines and had had some difficulty in extracting himself, reported. We then proceeded to our old front line to re-organise the men there and to generally take charge. We carried out this work and established forward posts at approximately R.24.c.8.5, R.24.c.5.5 and R.23.c.8.5.

During the morning of the 27^th the situation became much quieter, during the afternoon our post on the W. Miraumont Road was pushed forward about 100 yards, and a patrol from our right found that the E end of the sector of the German Line between the E & W Miraumont Road was not held. About 7pm Capt L’Amy pushed forward with 25 men and occupied this sector, connecting with our party on the right and connecting the occupation of our original objective.