The 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. left the Railway Embankment at Zillebeke at 11pm on October 3^rd [1917] to march up into position. On the way up orders were received from Brigade that the original plan of attack had been altered and that, owing to the 15^th D.L.I. having received many casualties from shell fire, the 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. would take the 2^nd objective, the 1^st East Yorkshire’s should support their attack and the 15^th D.L.I. would be in Brigade Reserve.

Despite enemy shell fire the march up as far as Clapham Junction was without casualties and the men kept exceedingly well closed up. At Clapham Junction the Battalion picked up four guides who had been up to reconnoitre the route. The guides, however, were of little use and they all 4 managed to lose their way within 300 yards. Fortunately one Officer and one N.C.O per company had been sent up in the afternoon and with assistance from them the Battalion safely arrived at Blackwatch Corner. From there it was not far to the forming up tape which had been laid out previously that night. Owing to the alteration in plans the tape was too far back for actual forming up but was extremely useful in giving direction.

By 4.30am October 4^th all the companies had been shown their places and by 5.30am they were properly in position. HQ had been established in a small Mebus about 14 feet long, 8 feet broad and 5 feet high. It was one of a colony of 5 or 6 Mebus which obviously had formerly formed an enemy strongpoint. The 1^st East Yorkshire Regt being unable to find any other Headquarters were offered room and established in the same place.

The disposition of the Coy’s for the attack was as follows: C Coy – right front; B - left front; D right support; A left support.

At 6am (zero hour) the Battalion moved off close on the heels of the 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. After going a short distance the right Coys, both of the 9^th and 10^th Battns were held up by a strongpoint (a machine gun in a defended shell hole). An attack was being organised on this point with the rifle grenadiers when a tank appeared close behind the right Coy and the enemy surrendered.

This strongpoint did not affect the left Coys who straight on down into the Polygone Beek Valley. The 9^th & 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. became mixed up on the right owing to the delay caused by the strongpoint. On arrival at the Beek owing to the marshy nature of the ground, direction became somewhat lost and though some Officers and men crossed the Beek by means of tree trunks etc, a large number of men converged on to the road on the right. During the crossing of the Beek heavy rifle and machine gun fire was experienced coming apparently from the right flank, from the direction of Juniper Wood. At this period a good many of the casualties occurred and both Battalions became mixed all along the line. The time was now about 6.30 or 6.45am.

A strongish belt of wire held up the right front Coy when they came to Joist Farm (J.10.d.2.2) but those who had gone round by the road avoided this wire. When the tanks came up they broke the belt of wire through which 2^nd/Lt Rooke of B Coy with his men went forward. After the tanks had gone through the Germans were surrendering in parties and some delay was caused to leading Coys, particularly the right front Coy, in clearing up the ground and sending back prisoners.

The advance then proceeded smoothly but the line had become very much mixed up and somewhat thinned owing to casualties. Little resistance was met with going up the hill from the valley and the leading men of the 9^th & 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. arrived at the 1^st Objective together. On reaching the 1^st Objective a party of some 30 N.F’s under and Officer appeared just on the left of the Reutel Road and joined the right rear Coy. Small parties of Devons, D.C.L.I and Queens were also mixed up with the Battalion on the 1^st Objective.

The right front Coy did not arrive at the 1^st Objective until the barrage had already started moving forward toward the second objective. The reasons for the delay were:-
1) They were held up by the wire in the valley (presumably in front of Joist Farm
2) They had difficulty in crossing the Polygone Beek
3) They were employed for some time in clearing the ground and sending back prisoners
In consequence the right support Coy which had gone on the road arrived at the 1^st Objective considerably before the right front Coy.

During the hour and 40 minutes (standing barrage beyond the 1^st Objective) the right of the Battalion was chiefly employed in cleaning up the ground and turning the enemy out of shell holes etc. The left was lying behind the 1^st Objective, mixed up with the 9^th Battalion and was heavily shelled.

It appears that all of the Officers in the right front Coy were killed or wounded by rifle and machine gun fire from Joist Farm. On reaching the objective there were only two officers in the Battalion left.

When the Barrage lifted remnants of the Battalion, particularly on the left, worked forward about 300 yards or so, but owing to the fact that the Battalion had many casualties both to Officers & Men previous to this, and that a certain number were employed making a defensive right flank, there was not more than 50 men available to go forward, some of whom were from other units.

On arrival as the 1^st Objective the officer on the spo[t] states that he could see none of the Division on our right, which should have been level with him and being anxious about his right flank he decided that after advancing 150 yards from the 1^st Objective it was impossible to hold a longer right flank without endangering the whole line. He therefore collected such men as he could find and formed a defensive flank. The line never got further forward that this. (J.11.c.8.3 - J.11.c.6.2 -J.11.a.4.1).

During the afternoon in the short intervals when the enemy was not shelling the front trenches the troops in the front line could do little but make a certain amount of cover, by connecting shell holes. When night fell the two officers and two Coy Sergeant Majors who were in command dug their trenches at a line N of Reutel, facing east. This trench was continued by the 9^th Bn as far as the road which runs through Reutel. On the south of the road some men of the 1^st East Yorkshire Regt under an Officer dug a small trench on our right rear, facing SE.

Owing to the mixed nature of the fighting and the number of casualties on the way to the 1^st Objective and the fact that the Division on the right did not keep up with our advance, as had been planned, there were insufficient men to go right forward as far as the second Objective without dangerously exposing the whole of the right flank. As it was there was a gap of some 700 yards between the right of the forward part of the East Yorkshire Regiment and the left of the D.L.I or the Division on the right.

October 4^th, about 1pm the enemy opened heavy fire on our front and rear lines and appeared to be going to counter attack. Whether he actually started to do so or not is uncertain. The S.O.S barrage was called for and stopped further trouble for the time being.

At 2.15p, the 1^st really serious counter attack began to develop. Heavy barrage fire was opened up on our lines and the enemy could be seen forming up in large number in the vicinity of Becelaere. The lowest estimate of the number seen forming up was 500, and it may have been double that number. This attack was apparently directed against Polderhouk Chateau and the left of the 5^th Divisional frontage. As there was a gap of some 600 yards on the right of the troops which were SE of Reutel the attack looked somewhat dangerous. However the S.O.S barrage was again called for and at the same time long range (over 1000 yards) machine gun and rifle fire was brought to bear on the enemy.

The enemy could not only be seen forming up but was also seen to move off in small “snake” formation, similar to our own. He must have suffered tremendous casualties from our SOS barrage and from our rifle and machine gun fire, but he commenced to advance. How far he got was impossible to for anyone to see except for those who were actually in front of him. The situation became quiet again about 4.30pm and remained so until 7pm when the SOS signal was again sent up by the troops on our right. At 8.30pm the situation once more became quiet. The S.O.S was signalled twice during the night at about 11pm and 2.30am but no neither occasion did any Infantry Action develop on the Battalion frontage.

During the whole of 4^th October the enemy kept up a heavy fire round Battalion Headquarters at I.15.b.3.8 and Blackwatch Corner and also right back to Clapham Junction.

During the night of 4/5^th a patrol of one officer and four O.R were sent into Reutel and brought back the information that there were no troops further forward in Reutel that the line previously reported and that no enemy troops had been encountered in Reutel. The enemy were, however, seen in Reutel on the afternoon of the 5^th and its seems probably that he had a certain number who were holding out in Reutel on the night of 4/5^th and who were reinforced early on the morning of the 5^th. The day of the 5^th was quiet  on the whole but there was intermittent shelling on the front line and Battalion HQ’s throughout the day. Communication was established by means of a lamp and Battn HQ’s back to Brigade also by lamp.

No counter attack developed during the day of the 5^th and on the night of 5/6^th it was found possible to relieve some Officers of the 9^th & 10^th Bns by other Officers in the 10^th Battalions who had been kept back at Bn HQ. These officers had already been found very useful in going up to reconnoitre the line and had brought back much valuable information.

Owing to the Commanding Officer of the 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. being killed the 9^th & 10^th Bns were amalgamated under the command of the Officer Commanding 10^th K.O.Y.L.I.

At about 6.30pm om the 5^th enemy infantry were seen advancing on the extreme right of our Brigade frontage and the SOS was sent up. It was also signalled at the same time by the troops on the left of the Brigade. The Infantry attack never materialised but was completely quelled by our Artillery. By 7pm the front line signalled that all was well.

During the night of the 5/6^th there was heavy shelling of the front line but no Infantry actions took place. During this night strong points had been established by 1^st East Yorkshire Regiments round our right flank and connection with the troops on our right had been secured.

The day of the 6^th passed quietly and was again spent in reorganising and consolidating the ground already captured. The Battalion were relieved in the on the night of the 6/7^th and moved to the Railway Embankment at Zillebeeke without casualties. The line was taken over by the 7^th Battalion Leicester Regiment.