On the 23rd of September, the 2nd Worcestershire Regiment left Chippewa Camp, near Dickebusch, and marched to Bedford House. The C.O’s. of the Brigade went on by car to reconnoitre the line to be taken up by their Battalions and to arrange the relief. The relief by the 2nd Worcestershire Regiment was complicated by the fact that it had to take over from no less than three Battalions — the 9th Yorks, 11th West Yorks and 11th Sherwood Foresters. The country, too, was difficult. It was a mass of shell-holes interspersed with marshes. The only landmarks were the various German concrete dug-outs, Inverness Copse, or what remained of it, and the numerous derelict Tanks. Of the dug-outs, one was more conspicuous than any of the others. There was a two-storeyed, loopholed, round Tower East of Inverness Copse, which was within fifty yards of the Headquarters dug-out of the 2nd Worcesters, and which was used as an Observation Post and Signal Station. There was a buried cable to it, a ‘phone to the Headquarters dug-out, and, from it, visual signalling was possible to Brigade Headquarters at Top House, about two miles to the southwest; a power buzzer was also installed there and baskets of carrier-pigeons.

The Battalion started from Bedford House at 1.30 on the 24th, to march by Platoons at 100 yards interval to the 66th Brigade (afterwards 69th Brigade) Headquarters at Stirling Castle. The route was by Maple Copse, Doring House and Zillebeke. On arrival at Stirling Castle the Companies were to have tea and move off at intervals to their place in the line.

There was a story after the action that a German officer prisoner had declared that the enemy was fully acquainted with this relief, having picked it up on his listening sets during the previous twenty-four hours. Whether this was so or not, the Germans must have had ample notice from their aeroplane which hovered over the track and, apparently without interference from our air-service, signalled by means of coloured lights to their guns.

The 98th Brigade were relieving the same day and seem to have used the same track as the 100th Brigade, though a more westerly one was available. Partly owing to this and to unpunctuality on the part of some units and to failure to keep the prescribed distances between Platoons, there was a constant stream of Infantry moving along the Zillebeke track through the 24th, and appreciable casualties were caused by the enemy’s artillery. The effect, too, on the troops, of the dead bodies along a track which should have been a fairly safe one, cannot have been good.

There was also a dangerous concentration of troops in the vicinity of Stirling Castle, where there was no adequate cover. It was due to good fortune alone that the enemy’s shells did not fall on this area, and that only a few casualties were incurred there. Guides met the Companies at Stirling Castle, and at 4 p.m., “A” Company, under Captain Booth, marched off and relieved a company of the 11th West Yorks in and around the concrete dug-outs about 150 yards north-west of Brigade headquarters.

It was followed at 6 p.m., by “C” Company, under Captain Ripley, which marched via Herentage Chateau and took over the dug-outs south of Brigade headquarters from the 9th Yorks. Both these reliefs must have been observed by the enemy, and were carried out under considerable artillery fire, as were all the subsequent reliefs.

At 6.30, the Headquarters company, under Second-Lieutenant Turley, marched off, and, passing through Inverness Copse, relieved the 9th Yorks at the Tower and Headquarters dug-out. “B” Company followed by the same route at 7 p.m., and reached the front line at 9.30 p.m., where it took over from “A” Company, 11th Sherwood Foresters. One-and-a-half Platoons were put into the front line, half a Platoon, under Second-Lieutenant Ponton, whose guide was killed, was temporarily lost, and the third Platoon arrived in the Support line at about 2 a.m.

“D” Company, under Captain Smith, was taken by its guide at 7.30 p.m., to a trench dug the previous night by the 11th Sherwood Foresters south of Northampton Farm. This trench was so full of water that the Company got into shell-holes behind it.

The C.O. — Lieutenant-Colonel Gogarty — and the Adjutant — Captain Fox — arrived at B Headquarters at 7 p.m. The C.O. of 9th Yorks left on the completion of the relief, at about twelve, midnight.

The Battalion strength on coming into the line was:-
“A” Company         119
“B” Company         117
“C” Company         121
“D” Company         124
H.Q.                166
Total               567 with 21 officers.

The attack of the 100th Brigade on the Polygon Hook Château line was timed to take place on the 26th. Final orders were therefore now written and issued at 2.30 a.m., on the 26th September.

This done, the C.O. and Adjutant started to go round the line, taking the orders for “B” and “D” Companies with them. Both on this and subsequent occasions, the difficulty of finding the way amid the mass of shell-holes, especially by night, was very noticeable. It interfered not only with the communication by runner but also with the supply of stores and ammunition.

Notification was received during the night of the 24th/25th that an army practice barrage would take place on the morning of the 26th, and a Corps barrage during the afternoon. The former started at about 5 a.m., and a German barrage commenced at approximately the same time. The German barrage was in three portions. The first was evidently intended for our front-line, and, on this occasion, it actually fell on “B” Company. It did not remain there long, however, but shifted about thirty yards west, where it remained during the rest of the fighting. The second portion was placed on the line of the three concrete dug-outs, only some 250 yards further west, and was evidently intended for our support line. The next, and apparently the main barrage, extended from in front of the Tower well to the west of Inverness Copse. This barrage was very severe. The Tower received direct hits every fifteen minutes, probably from a heavier gun. The fire came mainly from the east, but a good deal was from guns somewhere south of Gheluvelt, and this latter fire increased considerably and became especially severe on the 26th. The shells were mostly of medium calibre, up to 5.9 guns and howitzers.

As it grew light [on the 25^th], the ground east of the Tower was so covered with smoke from the shells of both sides that little or nothing could be seen. At about 8 a.m., a runner arrived from the front line with a message to the effect that reinforcements and S.A.A. were required there, that a number of the Battalion on the immediate right had surrendered, men of the Battalion on the Menin Road had also been seen to surrender as had some of the adjoining Brigade beyond the Reutel Beek.

The C.O. and Adjutant at once came down from the Tower and orders were issued to deal with this situation.

From subsequent information the story of what had happened in the front line would appear to be approximately as follows:-

Although the 100th Brigade had taken over the line more or less correctly, during the previous night, owing to the darkness, the difficulty of the country and the ignorance of it on the part of the relieved troops, there was a good deal of confusion. Especially was this the case with the Highlanders on our right. Many of their men were mixed up with other battalions and the general line occupied, instead of facing East, faced North.

The Germans had planned an attack on our line below the Menin Road and Polygon Wood for the morning of the 26th September. The artillery fire was to start at 5.15 a.m., and it was to be followed by an Infantry attack at 5.45 a.m. The enemy’s front line was to stand fast while three battalions passed through it, one North of the Reutel Beek, one South of it, and a Battalion of Storm troops along the Menin Road, which was held by two Companies of the 1st Queen’s with two companies in support.

When it began to get light, “B” Company, which was not in touch with the Highlanders on the right, found considerable numbers of the enemy in its front and in a low wood (the Osier beds) on its right flank. The enemy evidently did not quite know the situation and was nervous. A few men on the right of “B” Company opened fire with such good effect that the remainder of the Company, rapidly gaining confidence, joined in and brought the German advance in this part of the field to a standstill. “B” Company, however, was able from its position to see/surrender already reinforced and sent up the message which reached the C.O. in the Tower.

Evidently the first thing was to get reinforcements of men and S.A.A. to “B” Company. “A” Company was therefore turned out and ordered up to the front line. Some S.A.A. boxes were opened, and each man as he filed past the Headquarters was handed two or three bandoliers to carry forward with him.

The Company advanced very steadily under a heavy artillery fire, and under rifle fire probably from the small wood already mentioned, and from the Menin Road. It reached the Front Line where it took up a position in Echelon on “B” Company’s right rear. It lost two officers and eight or ten men during its advance. Captain Brooks had his leg broken by a shell, either on the way up or shortly after getting into position. This left 2/Lieutenant Loder in command, 2/Lieutenants High and Ashcroft being wounded.

There was now time to look round and try and grasp the situation, which was very obscure. On the ridge near the “Pimple” lines of men, apparently Germans, could be seen advancing. Close to the “Pimple” itself, which was a concrete tower south-west of Polygon Hook Château, were a number of British soldiers, some of them carrying a wounded man.

To the right, near the Menin Road, Highlanders could be seen walking along with their hands up.

The situation was rendered no clearer by a machine gun opening fire on Battalion Headquarters, apparently from a position South of it, and between it and the Menin Road. This fire was fortunately high.

At this moment a Platoon of Highlanders arrived at Battalion Headquarters on its way up to reinforce the front line. Bandoliers of ammunition were served out to the men as they passed and the Platoon went off in the direction of the Menin Road. Whether the machine gunner was under the impression that he was in danger of being cut off by this party, or for some other reason, he ceased fire and apparently retired.

The C.O., Adjutant, R.S.M., and others, were now standing outside the Battalion Headquarters dug-out, endeavouring to make out what was happening, when a shell struck the concrete wall of the dug-out behind them, killed Captain Fox, badly wounded R.S.M. Davis and scratched and bruised the C.O.

The latter, however, was able to remain at duty. By this time the front line had been further reinforced by “D” Company on the personal initiative of Captain Smith (vide Sketch), and, in spite of the presence of the enemy in the Copse on the right of “B” Company, the situation was well in hand. That this was the case was principally due to the admirable arrangements made by Captain Barker and to the good shooting of the men, which not only confined the Germans on the front and right flank to their shell-holes, but also stopped these being reinforced by section rushes from the “Pimple” slope.

The expenditure of S.A.A. was heavy, and supplies for more continued to be received. One Platoon of “C” Company, under 2/Lieut. Johnson, was therefore sent up soon after midday with a fresh supply. The Platoon was expeditiously well handled. Lieut. Johnson himself, with his runner, reported to Captain Barker, found out exactly where his men were required, and then skilfully brought them up to a position on the right flank of the Worcestershire line as shown in the sketch. This occurred shortly after 1 p.m.

At about 2 p.m., a message came from the Brigade by runner, to say that one company, 16th K.R.R.C., was being sent up to the Battalion as a reinforcement. Other messages were received shortly afterwards to say that the enemy was massing on the south-east and that counter-attacks were to be expected. During the afternoon the K.R.R.C. company, under Captain Chadwick, arrived, and was ordered to take up a position about halfway between the Tower and the front line in rear of the gap between the Tower and the Highlanders, and to counter-attack should the enemy penetrate the gap. The company did not reach this position but occupied either the trench shown south of Northampton Farm or the ground near it. Late in the evening it was withdrawn.

A message to the concrete dug-outs originally occupied by “A” Company, from where it rendered valuable assistance in carrying up supplies of S.A.A. and water through the barrage.

At about 3.30 p.m., an S.O.S. signal was sent up from the front line. This was repeated from the Tower, and (as no reply came) from Battalion Headquarters. It was twenty minutes before our barrage came down, and then it was weak. No information was received as to the reason for this S.O.S., which apparently came from somewhere on the right.

Another S.O.S. signal was given about 4.30, with very different results. The machine-gun barrage fire followed immediately, and a minute or so later came a perfect artillery barrage.

Second-Lieutenant Turley, who was the Worcestershire O.C. at the Tower at this time, was able to see a body of the enemy, estimated at about five hundred, advance past the south of Polygon Hook Château towards our line. About five minutes later another body, estimated at two Battalions, appeared in mass on the north of the Château. Both these formations were caught by our barrage and suffered such heavy losses that their advance was completely stopped.

The chief difficulties experienced during the 26th and, indeed, throughout the operations, were (a) Communication and (b) Provision of Supplies.

The provision for Communication was:-

• Pigeons. These worked well and were very useful.
• Buried Cable. Useless, on account of the heavy shelling.
• Power Buzzer. Did not work; reason unknown.
• Visual. Lamps were placed in the Front Line and signalled back O.K. at intervals, to the Tower. A flag on the Tower and lamps at its foot outside, sent messages to the Brigade. This worked fairly well, but both lamps and signallers suffered from the shells.
• Runner. On the whole this was good, if slow, but it failed once or twice on account of the enemy fire.

It will be noticed that, with the exception of runners, there was no communication from rear to front. Probably it would have been better had visual messages been sent. The fire could not have been heavier than it was, as the enemy knew our positions, and the danger of his reading our code would not have been great. It was unfortunate that the Battalion signalling officer was sick and unable to come into the line. There is no doubt that the arrangements for communication might have been improved upon.

As regards supplies, the difficulty was due to two causes, viz., the violence of the enemy’s fire and inadequate preparation. Had the latter been more complete, and numerous dumps of S.A.A., Very Lights, S.O.S. Signals, Water and Rations been established, the fire would not have been so great an obstacle. The few dumps that did exist were quite insufficient.

THE 26TH.

During the night of the 25th–26th, Brigade orders were received for the attack of the next day. The scheme had been modified. The 4th King’s was to advance about 800 yards, pivoting on its right; the remainder of the 100th Brigade was to stand fast or retake any portions of the line lost, while the troops on the left carried out the original scheme. Battalion orders to this effect were issued about 2 a.m.

The operations of the 26th were to commence with the Artillery preparation at 5.30 a.m., and the Infantry advance was to follow at 5.45 a.m. The German artillery fire which had been kept up throughout the night, started with renewed intensity at about 5.20. New guns, or rather Howitzers, were employed, and the direct hits on the roof of the Headquarters became so frequent that it seemed doubtful whether the building would hold out. Had it failed to do so, the calling place for Headquarters was one of “A” or “C” Company’s shelters. To carry on in the open under such a fire was impossible. The whole ground was churned up, even the bodies of the killed soon disappeared. It would have been well worth the enemy’s while to have detailed one or two heavy guns expressly for the dug-outs. Had they gone control would have been difficult, if not impossible. Fortunately, the building stood, and the Infantry attack presently caused the fire of the new howitzers to be diverted elsewhere.

The front companies were engaged in a fire-fight throughout the day and were never lost ascendancy they had on the “Pimple” and the Château and also on the enemy opposite the 98th Brigade beyond the Reutel Beek at ranges up to 50 yards. At about 2 p.m., the C.O. “B” Company received a message from the Highlanders that they were going to attack in twenty minutes’ time in order to join up with his right and the Queen’s left. Just then the Germans started shelling the neighbourhood of the Highlanders with great violence, and the attack did not develop until 4.30. In its initial stage it was a right wheel, and it was carried out with great dash and determination. It was carried out with great dash and determination. About seventy Germans were driven out from the Copse, and, as they passed “B” Company’s flank, were caught in enfilade by two Lewis guns. Only four escaped. They were closely followed by a machine gunner, who was killed, but a second man took the gun and almost reached the German line before he too fell. The gun was not captured, but the spare parts box was taken off the body of the first man.

While the attack of the Highlanders was in progress, a party of Germans appeared, about J.16. central, and advanced towards Jut Farm - strength about one company. This company was engaged by the left Company of the 2nd Worcesters, who knocked over a considerable number and brought the advance to a standstill. Shortly after this our guns shelled the hollow in rear of the “Pimple,” and drove the Germans in it towards us on the crest of the ridge. Many of them tried to get into the Pimple Tower and were caught by our shrapnel and the fire of the Worcestershire Front Line Companies. Their situation was so hopeless that they could be seen fighting and knocking each other down in order to get into the shelter of the Tower.

During the whole of the action the Infantry were worried by low flying enemy aeroplanes firing their machine guns. Our own planes were probably engaged elsewhere, in any case they were conspicuous by their absence on the 25th and 26th. Two of these enemy planes were brought down by rifle and machine-gun fire.

At the side of the Headquarters dug-out was a small German first-aid post, in which both the 4th King’s and the 2nd Worcesters installed aid posts both of the 4th King’s and the 2nd Worcesters. Some 340 wounded men passed through this post during the fighting. The congestion was very great. Every available space was filled with wounded and an overflow post was established in one of the “C” Company’s dug-outs. Things were made worse by the fact that, for 24 hours, no stretcher bearers arrived to evacuate these wounded, on account of the severity of the artillery fire between Battalion Headquarters and the first relay post at Clapham Junction. Eventually the Chaplain, the Rev. F. W. Tanner, went back himself through the barrage and brought back stretcher-bearers with him. Both the Chaplain and the Medical Officer, Captain Norris-Jones, were recommended for the D.S.O., on account of their gallant and self-sacrificing conduct during the operations.

Though no further Infantry actions developed in the Battalion front during the remainder of the 26th, the artillery fire was continuous and severe.

At midnight, Br.-General Baird, Commanding 100th Brigade, visited Headquarters and brought the news that the Battalion would be relieved by the 23rd Division on the following night. Orders for this arrived a few hours later.

THE 27TH.

At dawn on the 27th, the fire on both sides ceased, and, with the exception of odd shells and casual rifle or machine-gun fire, did not recommence until about 4 p.m. Advantage was taken of this to supply the front Companies with water and S.A.A. Rations had not arrived, and men had to subsist on their iron rations during the 26th and 27th. Many iron rations, together with the packs, had been destroyed by shells while the men were digging, so that some men were without food.

At about 3 p.m., the representative of the Sherwood Foresters arrived to arrange the relief and was followed by the C.O. at about 6 p.m. At about 7 p.m., the heaviest barrage yet experienced was directed on the line of the Tower and lasted for two hours. A further barrage was put down by the enemy from about 3.30 a.m. to 6.45 a.m. on the 28th. The Battalion was relieved between the hours of 1 a.m. and 7 a.m. on the 28th, the process being much facilitated by tapes which had been put down as guides.